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## RECENT TENDENCIES IN SOCIOLOGY.\*

### I.

#### THE PROCESSES OF SOCIALIZATION.†

*The unity of the social group is due to socializing processes, in which individual ideas and aims are moulded by social contacts and relations.*

Our science inherited from the eighteenth century an extremely individualistic theory of mind. In the psychology of that time, men are like billiard balls, which touch, but never interpenetrate. They can be united in harmonious association only by coincidence of interests or by some external pressure, some binding institution, such as law, religion, or authoritative instruction.

With the rise of the evolutionary hypothesis the view prevailed that the human species is undergoing incessant development, and that natural selection is constantly moulding the natures of men into harmony with the requirements of social life. Mr. Spencer represents this stage in the solution of the problem. He is struck by the mounting of specific social instincts which are slowly pressing back the ape and tiger in us. An ameliorative drift like this is, however, too leisurely to account for the improvements in social cohesion we see going on about us. Before our eyes, societies are forming, expanding, solidify-

\* In the following two papers it is the writer's intention to survey and briefly evaluate the more marked tendencies which appear in the sociological writing of approximately the last decade. One section, however,—that dealing with Economic Determinism,—has been omitted, in view of the recent able presentation of the subject by Professor Seligman in the *Political Science Quarterly*. For the sake of clearness each of the five tendencies has been formulated, and the literature exemplifying each has been brought together in a brief topical bibliography.

† See appended bibliography, No. I.

ing. What we need is a means of accounting for the groupings and regroupings we find crowded into the brief span of perhaps two or three generations.

Mr. Spencer somewhere acknowledges sadly that he has perforce abandoned his original conviction that man is a reasonable being. Others were abandoning the belief at the same time; and the way was first paved for a social psychology when the evolutionists dilated on the rôle of the instincts and passions in the ordering of human life. Other philosophers, like Von Hartmann, showed how much of the soul is unillumined, and argued that the world is ruled by the unconscious. When, finally, the psychologists brought to book the phenomena of hypnotic suggestion, the time was ripe for a new theory of social cohesion.

No sociologist has yielded more to these German ideas than Gustave Le Bon. With him the cohesion of men in society is largely spontaneous, and is seen in its simplest form in the crowd. The crowd is a psychological unity which puts the persons composing it "in possession of a sort of collective mind, which makes them feel, think, and act in a manner quite different from that in which each individual would feel, think, and act, were he isolated." This is due to the fact that in the crowd men lose their acquired characters and individualities, and revert to their instincts. They renounce that which distinguishes one from the other,—the deposits of education and reflection,—and meet on that substratum of unconscious life which is common to all of them. There is, furthermore, the fact that the sub-conscious self is highly susceptible to mental contagion. The self that rises to the surface in an excited crowd is the self that is laid bare when the hypnotist puts to sleep the higher controlling centres of the subject. In both cases the individual is as clay in the hands of the potter. In the crowd, then, one is, for the time being, socialized. He forgets those private interests of his which

suffer by the crowd's line of action. He blindly follows his leader, and is self-abnegating, even heroic, in furthering the common purposes. He is much more disinterested and sentimental than he is when isolated. The credulity of crowds, moreover, disposes men to accept, in the heat of enthusiasm, ideas which later may constitute an important social bond. These uncritical moments favor the implanting of beneficent illusions. Such convictions inspire in the crowd that blind submission, fierce intolerance, and proselyting zeal we associate with religious beliefs; for all popular convictions evince an imperious, dominating energy.

It is, then, the emotionalism and vast credulity of crowds which permit the fixation of unifying beliefs, illusions, and ideals. Were we always self-possessed and critical, the interferences of our interests would renew the struggle for existence in its harsher forms. "Without a doubt," says Le Bon, "human reason would not have availed to spur humanity along the path of civilization with the ardor and hardihood its illusions have done." "General beliefs are the indispensable pillars of civilization." "They alone are capable of inspiring faith and creating a sense of duty." Upon this crowd psychology, Le Bon founds his theory of social development. When the curtain of history rises, the stage is filled with unstable swarms of barbarians swept together by circumstances. In time an identical environment and the necessities of life in common bring about a blending of the unlike. Great leaders impress unifying beliefs, and the people acquires an ideal. Under the stimulus of this ideal a new civilization, with all its institutions, beliefs, and arts, is born. But in time a calculating individualism undermines the ideal. For a while, indeed, men are held together by their traditions and institutions. Nevertheless, the ideal finally perishes; and we have again a mere swarm of individuals which returns to the simple unity of its original state,—that of the crowd. The popu-

lace rules, barbarism mounts, and the cycle of civilization is complete.

This theory of the genesis of groups cannot be taken as more than a brilliant assault on the problem. Le Bon, while he skilfully lays bare the soul of the crowd, errs greatly in exalting this immediate ascendancy of the collective mind over individual minds to be the all-in-all of social unity. Mob-madness is an infrequent, temporary thing; and many of us have never experienced it. We do little of our thinking or acting in a crowd, and what we think or do there leaves but few traces. Society, unlike the mob, is organized and acts deliberately: whereas the mob acts quickly and under excitement. In it *truths* and *inventions* have more vitality than mere *suggestions*. There are plenty of theatrical persons who can *suggest* in a striking way; but society gives such scope to reason that, in the long run, its leader may be the shrinking investigator or the scholarly recluse rather than the orator or the prophet.

Tarde, although he makes suggestion-imitation the corner-stone of his sociology, does not start from an abnormal phenomenon, like the mob mood. Impressed no less than Le Bon by the marvels of suggestion as brought to light by the hypnotist, he, nevertheless, inquires how our choices are shaped, not in the press of the mob, but in our cool private moments. Recognizing that whatever translates men from conflict to co-operation facilitates social groupings, Tarde identifies the socializing process with the growing resemblance brought about by imitation. In the spread of examples from the hero, the nobility, the city, or the capital, in the superseding of neighborhood or provincial culture by a national culture, in the spread of beliefs and practices from the higher civilization to the lower, in the resulting assimilation of nationalities and convergence of peoples, he detects the beginning of every higher human synthesis. The guarantee of peace lies in

agreement as to the ground plan of life,—in community of religion, morals, and tastes. Let men approach the same plane of beliefs and desires, and they will beat their swords into ploughshares, no matter how their interests clash. Society is that circle in which the struggle for existence has become bloodless; and this occurs only where there is resemblance in ideas, standards, costumes, manners.

Within the historic period there has been a progressive enlargement of political society; *i.e.*, of the circle of peace. Thus he says: “From a countless number of very small but exceedingly bitter wars between petty clans, we pass to a smaller number of somewhat larger and less rancorous wars: first between small cities, then between large cities, then between nations that are continually growing greater; till finally we arrive at an era of very infrequent but most impressive conflicts, quite devoid of hatred, between colossal nations, whose very greatness makes them inclined to peace.” This irenic progress keeps step with the historic march of civilization. Conquest, migration, intercourse, commerce, intermarriage, have destroyed countless petty languages, religions, local customs, systems of laws, and moral ideals; have fused little cultures into national and cosmopolitan cultures; have spread accents, wares, ideas, and cravings; and have brought humanity into everenlarging basins of civilization,—first a mountain valley, then a river plain, then an inland sea. And civilization, which both in the Orient and in the Occident has become oceanic, will, no doubt, in the twenty-second century be planetary.

This process of assimilation — the laws of which have recently been ably formulated by Miss Simons on the basis of wide historical researches — will always be thought of in connection with Tarde’s studies in imitation. When he came on the field, sociologists were so much impressed with the social division of labor that they saw in social evolution nothing but differentiation. Spencer averred

that the great process in society is the passing from the like to the unlike. Tarde, on the other hand, thinks it is the heterogeneous that is "unstable." Differentiation holds true of men as producers: as consumers, the drift is the other way. The formula is, growing unlikeness as workers, growing likeness as livers and enjoyers. The specialization of trades and professions is merely an economic fact. The socializing process is that growth in the closeness and extent of similarity which multiplies sympathies, promotes co-operations, and makes for harmony among men.

This notion of the socializing process is held by Gummowicz, although he ignores the assimilation that goes on between societies, and assumes that mental approach can take place between peoples only after they have been clamped together by conquest. With him the specific bond of the innumerable groups that are linked together in a national society is the consciousness of resemblance, whether physical or mental. The cause of resemblance may be either intermarriage or social intercourse.

Professor Giddings agrees that assimilation is the socializing process *par excellence*, but he finds at the bottom of all groupings what he happily terms "the consciousness of kind." This may be inspired, not alone by the resemblance brought about by imitation, but as well by original similarity in body or temperament, or by resemblance arising from the influence of the same environment, occupation, or experiences. This state of mind is the true and only cement among men, and upon its range and intensity Giddings makes depend the size and intimacy of all groups whatsoever.

To do full justice to the sentimental side of association, we need, however, a term even wider than consciousness of kind. We must explain the clashing of groups as well as their merging, men's oppositions as well as their unions. Our behavior towards others is not determined

simply by a perception of resemblance shading off to zero, inspiring a sympathy graduated down to indifference. There is as well a perception of difference, awaking a positive antipathy. We hate people whose ways are utterly different from ours, and wage upon them a "holy war." Both factors—the repulsion as well as the attraction—must be taken into account, in order to predict into what groups a given population will fall.

Again, the same traits do not have the same value for all. Notice what points of difference fix themselves in men's attention when they are lashing themselves into a violent antipathy. With the rude masses, personal appearance or habits count for much. One thinks of his foes as "niggers," "greasers," "round-heads," "rat-eaters," "frog-eaters," "uncircumcised," "red necks," "red-haired foreign devils," "fuzzy-wuzzies." Somewhat higher is the type that thinks of the enemy as a "*parley-voo*," a "goddam," a "heathen," "papist," "heretic," or "infidel." Higher yet is the man who is struck by cultural differences only, and who detests those who are "savage," "barbarous," "benighted," or "depraved." In this and in various other directions the sentimental principle of human relations is in need of development before it can do justice to the facts.

In seeking the causes of the persistence of groups, Professor Simmel has developed the consciousness-of-kind theory by showing just what points of resemblance have the most cohesive worth. These appear to be:—

1. A common valued possession, such as landed property, a national territory, or public buildings. Those who have an undivided ownership of the same possession tend to behave as a unit.
2. A common and prized symbol, such as a flag, a regimental standard, a palladium, grail, or temple. Those who value the same symbol are drawn together.
3. Love of, or obedience to, the same chief or dynasty.

Fellow-subjects of the same prince, disciples of the same prophet, form naturally a sympathetic group.

4. Consciousness of a group "honor," which is in the custody of all, and which is damaged if one fails to reach a certain standard. This means simply that the world thinks of them as one body, so that the glory or shame of one becomes the glory or shame of all. The fusion of members in the thought of the public creates a group "honor," which reacts integratingly upon the group.

The rise, then, of a common possession, symbol, leader, or "honor," socializes the persons involved with reference to one another.

Professor Baldwin approaches the problem as a genetic psychologist fresh from the study of the child mind. From his observations of the growth of personality he is led to attach less importance than do Tarde and Giddings to agreement in the contents of the mind, and dwells rather on the fact that the thought of the other person is built into the very foundations of the thought of one's self. At the dawn of its mental life the child has selfish instincts, but it has no notion of self. This idea it can only slowly build up out of its sensations and out of elements that, by imitation, it has taken from those about it. But this wholesale appropriation of what was "other" makes it easy to impute this enriched self-notion to "other." The child interprets persons in terms of its own subjective experiences, because it has no other means of interpreting them. I use the same notion of personality now in thinking of *ego*, now in thinking of *alter*. Hence I read into the other person the same desires and interests I feel in myself. What I want and claim I must by the very same thought allow others to want and claim. Whatever I fancy, hope, fear, desire for self, in general remains the same, whether afterwards I do qualify it by the word "my" or the word "your." So, whenever my interests are entangled with those of another, I am moved to give

equal weight to the claims of self and the claims of other. And this solution is justice.

What fits us for association, then, is not so much resemblance in this trait or that, as identity in mental constitution. However far apart we may be in creeds or standards, the social relation is possible so long as the same self-thought will interpret both *ego* and *alter*. What Baldwin has found the root of is not clannishness, but sociality; not what unites men of the same stripe, but what draws together all sorts and conditions. The bipolar self, or *socius*, that normally grows up in the budding years, serves just as well as a social instinct. As beings that think, yearn, strive, or suffer, we are all potential associates. There is a primary bond among all human beings able to get in touch; and to this is added, as Gumplowicz, Tarde, and Giddings rightly insist, a new strand for every fresh resemblance that is perceived.

Baldwin shrewdly detects, besides these sympathetic bonds, a purely impersonal sense of oughtness, or sense of being under law, which he traces to the child's experience of being made to obey. The habit formed in the family of acting under parental law prepares one for later voluntary obedience to an abstract rule of right, and constitutes a very important element in socialization. In thus recognizing the moulding value of external pressure and sanction, he admits a new factor,—the great factor of *control*.

Rival to the *resemblance* theory is the view that groups are built by *community of interests*, that it is chiefly the experience of finding others to be helpless in one's life ends that engenders sympathies. On the one principle, men cleave to their kind, and shun opposites; on the other principle, they seek complements, and shun competitors. The former postulates *sentiments*, the latter *practical motives*, as the first ground of union. Simmel holds to the latter explanation, and cites as crucial

instance, "Common antagonism against a third party tends under all circumstances to consolidate the combining groups, and with much greater certainty than friendly relationships towards a third party."

Durkheim, too, leans strongly to this utilitarian interpretation of society. For social life he distinguishes two sources,—similarity of minds and the social division of labor. In the former case one is socialized because, being only slightly individualized, he identifies himself with his kind; in the latter case, because the very individuality and function which mark him off from others make him the more dependent on others. Societies pass from the primitive organic solidarity that arises from likeness to the later organic solidarity that arises out of interdependence. It is not conclusive, however, for Durkheim to point out that the social division of labor has never yet broken up society into selfish guilds. If growing specialization has not relaxed the bonds of sympathy, it is, perhaps, because the communion of ideas and tastes has meanwhile proceeded even more rapidly. Our specialism, Tarde might well reply, is tempered by Herculean educational endeavors, which aim to join us by common standards of decency, ideas of right, or interest in learning, faster than we are being sundered by vocation. Reading the same journals, following the same styles, co-operating in the same church, party, or lodge, we assimilate even faster than we differentiate; and, if eight hours a day we are moulded to diverse tasks, eight other hours a day, including holidays, we are steeped in and saturated with the same civilization.

The debate between the social psychologists, who deem assimilation the socializing process, and the economists, who identify it with the growing together of interests, appears to be a drawn battle. Each side can overwhelm the other with facts, and the spectator concludes that the two group-building forces divide the world between them.

It is a query, however, if the latter has not the greater future before it. Does not that progress in character which weakens the sway of blind, intense feelings, and fortifies self-control and rationality, favor those groups with a distinctive interest and sphere of action at the expense of groups that are held together by a consciousness of kind? Will not that antipathy inspired by unlikeness of color, speech, religion, nationality, or civilization, be more and more condemned as a "prejudice" that one is to "rise above," whereas conflict of interest will continue to be regarded as necessarily divisive?

So much for the optimists, the thinkers who are so impressed with the knitting together of men by their contacts and interactions that for them the problem of socialization is solved. In their eyes, union is easy, order natural, tranquillity spontaneous, and the struggle for existence a conflict with nature, and not with our fellow-men. But some there are who do not share this view. Is, then, the primitive struggle so easily put aside, the give-and-take spirit proper to social life so easily come by? Fellowship craving may draw together ten or a hundred; but does it unite ten thousand or ten million? Love may create households and coteries and churches; but is it the architect of towns, cities, and states? "Pleasure in companionship," "pleasure in co-operation," are luxuries; and, if men have formed groups under the stress of conflict, it is likely that fear, hunger, or greed rather than sociability have brought them to it.

The stern necessity of winning or defending a food share or a feeding ground hurry men into association ere they are ripe for it. Not the attraction of like for like, but war or the dread of war has instigated that unceasing agglomeration of communities revealed in history. Groups arise too soon, form before the natural socializing forces have done their work. Central organs appear while yet the premature society, owing to social unfitness of its mem-

bers, is torn by violence. Will not these organs seek to check this waste and cure these ills by setting up artificial processes of socialization, to eke out the tardy work of natural socialization? In a word, must not *social control* be counted a factor, if not in instituting, at least in improving, society? How otherwise account for massive institutions, like police, church, school? Wherefore laws, courts, hangmen? Why the yoke of codes, the burden of ceremonial, the shackles of creed, the gyves of common opinion, the moral corsets laced upon our minds by the schoolmaster? Is social order a matter of silken cords and rose-water, or is it a matter of "iron and blood"?

These considerations raise up opponents of the optimistic school in the very heyday of its success. Men of juristic training like Von Thering and Pot and Vaccaro show that the mutual adaptation of men has been difficult, and dwell upon the worth of law, custom, religion, and the moral code in creating harmony and order. But even they overlook many of the means and devices of social control. Preoccupied with *institutions*, they overlook those *conventions*, which float freely in the social mind without visible source or seat. The study of these shows that to collective suggestions, personal ideals, authorized illusions, and social valuations is due no little of that harmony which has been credited to the "dialectic of personal growth," the "consciousness of kind," or the "solidarity of interests."

## II.

### THE GROUP-TO-GROUP STRUGGLE WITHIN SOCIETY.\*

*Society is a theatre of struggle between classes, corporations, and parties for the advancement of their respective interests.*

The old ontological concept of society — that it is a real integral being — closed our eyes to the series of minor

\* See appended bibliography, No. II.

groups that lie between the individual, and the whole competing with it for his allegiance. The organic concept likewise misled us by focussing attention on the functional groups. In a living body the organs by means of their functions minister to the welfare of the whole, and there is no sign of any contention of part with part. If the organs and members are unequally nourished, it is because the nervous system, the unquestioned master of the rest of the body, apportions the blood on the communistic principle,—“To each according to his needs.”

Now, if society is a being of this kind, we must suppose that the operative groups accept submissively the nutritive elements that come to them under the established system, and that the regulating apparatus—the political bodies, for example—acts with sole reference to the welfare of the entire society. The capture of this apparatus by a scheming class, in order to promote its own interests at the expense of the rest, would be a derangement, a dementia as of a person obsessed by an *idée fixe*.

But why, after all, should we view our facts through this golden haze of beneficent adaptation? Why assume that in society all struggle will take the form of man-to-man competition? Will not those of kindred interests find one another out, band together, and organize themselves the more effectively to assert their claims as against similar organized bands supporting rival claims? Indeed, is not groupwise conflict inevitable the moment society differentiates into categories of men with distinctive and incompatible interests? The organicists linger over the *functional groups* or “organs,” composed of persons who co-ordinate their efforts in some producing, distributing, or regulating activity. Of this sort is a factory staff, a clearing-house, a police force, an administrative department. But there are at least three other kinds of groups in society.

1. *Local or regional groups*, termed by some “com-

pound societies," or "segments," and composed of neighbors exposed to the same physical environment and united by certain special interests. In barbarian society these are the chief struggle units; but in modern society they are fast losing their special interests, and consequently their identity.

2. *Fraternal groups*, characterized by special cohesion, seeing that the sympathy and pleasurable companionship of their members with one another is greater than with outsiders. Those of the same group associate freely and have a more or less vivid consciousness of kind; but between members of different groups there is relative indifference, sometimes even suspicion and dislike. These groups are based on resemblance partly *cultural*—similarity in opinions, ideals, and tastes—and partly *economic*,—similarity in pecuniary condition and mode of life. Although these groups do not clash, they are relatively non-fraternizing, and mark sometimes a real "solution of continuity" in the social substance.

3. *Struggle groups*. These arise from the rallying of persons about a common *interest*, in order to support it and advance it even at the expense of other interests. The incorporating of an interest in this way compels others to do likewise, and so intensifies the struggle between them. The rise of such groupings sharpens oppositions of which people were only vaguely conscious, and builds up minor solidarities at the cost of the general solidarity. Any great national society, however seamless it may appear at a distance, will be found at close hand to be a patchwork,—a web in which various patterns have been broidered. It is the theatre not only of man-to-man competition, but also of a constant though ordered struggle between guilds, corporations, sects, and classes that impair the general composure just in proportion as they perfect their own cohesion.

Professor Durkheim, after exploring the foundations of

law and morals, concludes that the early solidarity, based on the likeness of all the members of the community, afforded no such support to morality as does the present solidarity, based on division of labor. The bond knit by the dependence of part on part is closer and stronger. To promote social unity, therefore, we have only to keep on in this path. Let us extend and perfect incorporation on the basis of function. Let each profession and interest become a *collegium* with an internal order of its own, yet operating smoothly within the larger corporation we call society.

This proposal to deepen the convolutions in the social substance will enchant the organicists with their robust faith in the division of labor. Is it not likely, however, that the functional group, if encouraged, will develop the teeth and claws of the struggle group? Did the formation of a general managers' association and an American railway union prove a pledge of peace? Tarde is right in insisting that it is not what men have apart, but what they have in common that unites them. Trade and professional groups, codes, and journals would split up society, were it not for the tide of common ideas and sentiments that rises even faster than do these partitions.

Probably the hierarchy of struggle groups — from those asserting the interest of a neighborhood or a logging gang to those that stand for a great region or a world-wide class — would never have been so ignored by theorists, had it not been for the national society. During the era of exaggerated nationalism, this stood so huge, so sharply defined by language, so centralized by administration, so knit together by its special sentiment, patriotism, that sociologists, overawed, exclaimed, "Behold Society!"

War is waged between states, and war had so solidified the war-waging corporation that it appeared to overrule and hush the antagonisms in the interior of the political society. The organ asserting the national interest by vio-

lence utterly overshadowed the narrower struggle groups, asserting minor interests by legal means. But "the canker of a long peace," with the fading of national antipathies, the mellowing of patriotism, and the liberalizing of the state in its train, breaks the political spell, and brings to light at last the unsuspected natural organization of men for success in the struggle for existence.

It is significant that Italian sociologists, living among a people that has never been cast all of a piece in the iron mould of warfare, have scouted the organic theory of society. In the eastern part of Europe, moreover, where the fusion of shattered nationalities in the crucible of new empires is still far from complete, the intellectual and political contest for mastery is far more striking than in the better-welded societies of the west. Where equality before the law is not conceded to all, where feudal society has not yet been dissolved by industrialism, and where government is the instrument of a class rather than the organ of the general will, the infra-social struggle is too naked and obtrusive to be hidden by a decent drapery of words.

Naturally, it has not been the hand of a Spencer or a Tarde that has lifted the lid off the seething caldron. To Italians like Loria and Vaccaro, to the German Ratzenhofer, to the Austrian Pole Gumplowicz, and to the Russian Novicow belongs the credit of first setting forth the forms, phases, and laws of the struggles that persist in the interior of societies.

In France, England, and the United States, on the other hand, the social harmony is so considerable that the *Klassenkampf* theses of Gumplowicz or Loria strike us as exaggerated. We are far from ready to confess that the "social organism" is a myth, and that "society" is a *mélée* of interest groups, with the state as keeper of the lists. We love to think that with few exceptions each is concerned only for the public weal, and that the whole people thrills with the same wrath, pride, pity, or passion for justice.

Professor Giddings, who in his first volume seemed somewhat taken with the ideas of Novicow, has in his last book all but ignored conflict, and agrees with Spencer and Tarde that society constantly approaches a harmony of sentiments and desires.

According to Gumplowicz, the Nestor of the Darwinian sociologists, the chief factors that make struggle groups are propinquity, habitual association, blood kinship, rank, possessions, occupation, and such moral facts as language, religion, science, and art. The cohesive strength of a combination depends on the number of group-making factors that knit together its members. The smaller group has the more ties; and hence the group that embraces the rich and influential, since it makes up in cohesion, organization, and brains what it lacks in numbers, has the most power under normal conditions. But in times of revolution numerical strength counts; and the masses that ordinarily lack organization, because of their bulk and their engrossing tasks, may become formidable.

Each group faces other groups on behalf of its own interests solely, and knows no standard of conduct but success. The aim of the struggle is to establish appropriate institutions for safeguarding or increasing the power or means of the group. The clergy want immunity from secular supervision, manufacturers want a protective tariff, bankers free issuance of notes, slaveholders a guarantee of their property wherever their flag flies, capitalists the right to import cheap labor, laborers the right to boycott.

Each group has its favorite weapons of combat. The priests may refuse to perform religious rites, laborers strike, employers shut down, bankers precipitate a panic, the noble or rich withhold social recognition. Each group, too, has its own organs for conducting the struggle. The priests have their hierarchies and synods, the business men their chambers of commerce, the laborers their walking delegates, the farmers their granges; while the rich

have polite society. The ruling class has in addition the machinery of government. The state fixes legal norms for the relations of classes, and so a contest rages for the possession of this valuable organization. The successive coming to consciousness of lower and wider layers of the people results in a series of struggles for emancipation, and in the sharing of political power among several classes. But in the mean time an unsocial compound has taken the place of society, and the age of despotic force recurs.

Loria carries the theory of class selfishness so far as virtually to resolve the evolution of a society into a series of parallel class evolutions. He sees no institutions conserving the collective welfare, but only institutions that reflect the egoism of groups. Religion, ethics, law, politics, and finance express alike the interest of the dominant class, and change as it changes. The supernatural morality of savages is devised to keep the women in subjection to the men. Christianity won the powerful because its promise of heaven disposed the poor to resignation. Even public opinion is no moral reflex, but the exponent of selfish property owners.

The state is an arena of incessant combat. Rent receivers form one class, owners of productive capital another, those interested in banking or loan capital a third class. The unproductive laborers maintained out of these incomes — clerics, officials, soldiers, journalists, professional men — constitute a fourth class. As for the productive laborers, they do not count at all. Political changes are due to economic conditions which disturb the balance of power among these four classes or alter their grouping. Political parties represent such groupings; for banking capital is apt to become the ally of rent, while the unproductive laborers usually befriend capital.

Convinced that property underlies politics, Loria ventures to neglect men entirely, since they but reflect their pecuniary interests. So he omits party names, and puts

forward income as the active agent in politics. We read of profits "triumphing," rent "meeting its Waterloo," land "uniting itself" to banking capital, small holdings "engaging in a fierce struggle" with great estates. In the mediæval quarrel between Church and State he sees only a struggle between ecclesiastical and secular property.

Surely, this simplicism masks the real complexity of social phenomena! Loria, indeed, throws light on law, politics, and finance, but he fails lamentably in interpreting religious and ethical systems; for unquestionably these are, to a great extent, of folk or universal origin, and by no means mere class products.

Taking for his theme *conflict*, whether between societies or within society, Novicow has worked out a scheme representing all its gradations and attenuations, from the wars of cannibals to the debates of scientists. The struggle for existence he declares to be universal; but in it he detects an ameliorative principle, whereby the stronger finds it his interest to abandon brutal oppression. Hence massacre tends to pass over into robbery, robbery into exploitation, exploitation into monopoly, monopoly into privilege, privilege into competition, competition into discussion. Though groups are animated by self-interest, the stronger will find it more to their advantage to enslave the weaker than to eat them, to trade with them than to enslave them, to assimilate them than to oppress them, and to assimilate them by mild methods than by coercive measures. With this amelioration, pity or philanthropy or religion has had absolutely nothing to do. It is all credited to the enlightenment of the stronger.

Vaccaro, in a work less vivacious but more scientific than Novicow's, undertakes to explain the dying away of conflict,—the "adaptation" that comes to pass between societies and within societies. While his survey of external struggle and of the causes that attenuate it con-

stitutes an admirable *résumé* of the evolution of war, Vaccaro puts his best effort upon the phases, limits, and means of ameliorating the interior struggle.

Unlike Gumplowicz who insists that the state originates only with the superposition of tribes by conquest, Vaccaro finds that even in a simple militant society a coercive organization springs up about the war chief. He grants, of course, that the composite society where the undisguised parasitic relation prevails between peoples is the scene of the most momentous deadlock of interests. Even here, however, there comes in time a "let up" on the part of the conquerors, because in this way they economize coercion and supervision and profit more than by a policy of violence. Hope being a greater stimulus than fear, the masters find it to their advantage to concede the exploited a measure of security and freedom. The struggle among the conquerors themselves results usually in the successive domination of the warrior, priestly, aristocratic, and popular classes; and, as this implies the exercise of power by larger numbers and more heterogeneous elements, there ensues a gradual conciliation of interests and mitigation of the societary struggle.

For the progress of infra-social adaptation there are several causes. Warfare leads to the survival of the best-knit societies. As food outruns population, the "interests" for which classes contend cease to be matters of life or death. A body of belief is formed, which, transmitted as custom, morality, and law, hastens the mutual adaptation of men. Selection weeds out the unsocial and favors the survival of the friendly. Thus the adaptive process marches irresistibly on; and, however harsh the régime established by the sword, power comes in time to be shared, legal rights are generalized, the state ceases to be the tool of parasites, and inter-class exploitation becomes mild and inobvious. Time, that leveller that tumbles the earth-work into the trench and fills the moat with the ruins of

the castle wall, wears down the sharp oppugnances of races, and turns the cliffs and chasms of the conquest régime into the gentle declivities of the competitive society.

Ratzenhofer takes not the "social aggregate," but the "social formation," as his point of departure. The national group we are apt to call "society" is simply one of the wider unions in the ascending series of forms. As some of the firmest, most highly individualized social formations are non-territorial,—*i.e.*, have horizontal rather than vertical boundaries,—it is idle to identify "society" with any local or regional group. The state, indeed, has a defined area; but the state is not the bottom fact of social science. For the sociologist the primary element is a definite cluster of persons conscious of a joint interest and facing other groups as a unit.

Between such a group and an organism there is a real analogy. Like a living body, it has the power of self-movement, its course being determined by the unifying interests of the members and by their ideas and feelings respecting the forces in their environment. It grows through the attraction of new members up to the limit that defines its natural sphere of usefulness. Further growth resembles fatty degeneration, and is hurtful; for the adhesion of persons less and less sympathetic with the original spirit of the group brings dissension. The group then throws off receding groups, the offspring varying more or less from the parent. If the parent group is unable to recover its original ideal, it disintegrates, and its members enter other combinations.

The struggle group also resembles a *person* in that it elaborates a *group-will*, which differs from and reacts upon the *individual will* of its members. This will is the resultant of the wishes of its members, on the one hand, and, on the other, of the impulses given by rival or dominant groups in its environment. If, in striking the bal-

ance, the leaders give too much weight to the crude demands of adherents, the group projects shatter on the opposition they arouse. If too little weight is given, the adherents become lukewarm and fall away. The group-will dominates most when founded on *common* interests, so that each may hope for something for himself from every victory of his group. Nevertheless, group success requires the *renouncing* of some private aims, and hence implies *limitation* upon the individual will.

Struggle groups vary in degree of individualization. If the animating purposes and guiding ideas of such a group are vague, it will show no definite boundary and strongly marked character. It will readily split up or unite with other groups. But, the more distinct its aim from rival aims in its environment, the more it will feel itself apart in origin and destiny. If evoked by an imperious need, it will exact the undivided allegiance of its members, and it will be loath to admit persons that are not wholly devoted to its aims.

Every group tends to form an *authority* constituted by a few, to which the rest are subject. When this is exaggerated, when the group individualizes too much, becoming, as it were, too absolute an *ego*, there comes from without a socializing impulse, a waft of freedom, which relaxes outgrown authority. In the history of every group there is alternation of hardening and loosening, of compulsion and emancipation.

The social process is, in fact, double. The energy of opposition a group encounters gives it consistency and unity, accentuates its specific and distinctive character. On the other hand, multiplying points of agreement between its members and outsiders tone down the peculiarities of the group, weaken its organization, level the barriers it has raised against rivals. Thus individualization and socialization work incessantly in a people. Whoever seeks refuge from the inclement struggle for

existence betakes himself to the shelter of his group. Whoever is galled by the yoke of his group seeks support elsewhere.

There is no question that the recognition of the infra-social struggle is bound to leave a deep impress on sociology. Though psychologists scout the old doctrine that society is a balance of personal egoisms, we are not thereby debarred from regarding it as a balance of class egoisms, seeing that groups are demonstrably more self-centred than the persons composing them.\* Nevertheless, the new doctrine needs to be shorn of certain East-European exaggerations, and co-ordinated with established sociological principles.

The notion that associations founded on interest are absolute units, and know no limits to their selfish aggressions, contradicts the law that *sympathy is strong in proportion to the degree of resemblance recognized*. The Free-mason or the friar, the capitalist or the union laborer, keeps a bit of his personality, even if he has cast in his lot with an aggressive association. When the demands of his group reach a certain pitch of exorbitance, he remembers he is, after all, a man and a citizen. Thus group-to-group struggle is moderated by the consciousness of a common nationality and culture. A perfect group unity can arise only from an absolute enmity, and this will be found only between distinct races. In the United States all the worst lawless societies — Molly Maguires, Mafia, Ku-klux Klan, Clan-na-gael — have had their riots in the opposition of races rather than the clash of interests.

The idea that every struggle group exerts always its utmost power, and goes the full length of its tether, is at variance with the principle that *the will to resist is greater than the will to aggress.*† Our American experience shows that those classes engaged in industrial pursuits — farmers, miners, artisans — are more ready in defence than in ag-

\*See the author's *Social Control*, pp. 71-76.

† *Ibid.*, p. 38.

gression: whereas those engaged in pecuniary employments—merchants, manufacturers, bankers, railroad men—are nearly as vigorous in aggression as in defence. In the progress of a victorious group composed of industrials there is a point at which the feeling spreads that further advantages at the expense of other classes would be "unfair," and beyond this point the vigor and unity of action decline. Because of these "dead points" in the will to self-aggrandizement, it is possible to set up a political system in which the tension and struggle of classes is happily brought to a minimum.

Again, it is indubitable that the individuality of a struggle group varies inversely with the individuality of the containing society; and this in its turn varies directly with the amount of opposition the society has to encounter. For it is a universal law that *the bonds of any group, be it great or small, tighten with danger and relax with security*. Just as the *ego* attains self-consciousness—so we are told—through the *non-ego*, a nation "finds" herself through her awareness of other nations. "Iron sharpeneth iron," and the clash with oppressors or foes hardens a folk and hushes the strife of factions. No nation, for example, has been so conscious of other nations as rivals or critics as modern Japan; and no people has shown a fainter sense of divisive interests than the Japanese. Complacent, self-centred China, on the other hand, cankered by clan and class selfishness, needs, it is said, but a vivid sense of other nations to fight or emulate, to close up her ranks and develop a patriotic spirit. A people engrossed in private aims tends invariably to fall into struggle groups; yet, if a national aim presents itself,—say a defensive war,—the socializing process is set up and the rifts close.

Finally, the cohesion of groups and their ability to face and fight one another as units implies a reluctance of their members to compete among themselves. But this reluctance, while partly due to consciousness of kind, is certainly

due in part to the difficulty of one's getting on by individual efforts. In a thoroughly competitive society that knows no legal or social barriers to the ascensional energy of the individual, class groups are apt to be loose in texture and vague of outline. With competition free and fair, the more vigorous prefer to struggle and triumph as individuals rather than as myrmidons. Since they infect the rest with this tonic spirit of self-reliance, the law holds, *the more universal the man-to-man struggle, the less pronounced is the group-to-group struggle.*

Besides these four limiting principles, there are several circumstances that affect the degree of intestinal strife in a society undergoing economic differentiation. The alienation of classes is limited by systems of regulative ideas of a universal character,—a common religion, moral ideal, or political faith,—developed before the rise of classes. Perfect freedom to agitate and discuss often makes it possible to reach, even on a matter affecting interests, a truly public opinion, overruling and superseding the jarring opinions prompted by class bias. Again, when a society is at once competitive and dynamic, so that individuals constantly mount to a higher or sink to a lower plane, a sense of class interest is slow to form. So far as the *personnel* of the social strata is fluid and changing, their conflicts of interest are not aggravated by the inbred antipathies that spring up between hereditary classes. Free education, too, since it facilitates the upward movement of brains, hinders the crystallization of class feeling.

Then the pulse of national life responds to the ebb and flow of prosperity. Sectional or class antagonisms evoked by special stress die away with the conditions that gave them birth. In hard times suffering classes, becoming irritable, spit and claw at one another; but in good times they lap contentedly at the same saucer of milk. The free expansion of national energies makes for social peace, while a pent-up people tends to split up into jarring groups.

The two-party system presupposes a low intensity of class opposition, and it seems to prevail only among peoples that enjoy wide outlets for their energies.

On the whole, however, it is the popularizing of government that has done most to quiet the infra-social struggle. Almost everywhere the state began, not as organ of society, but as engine of an exploiting class. If through most of the Occident it no longer bears this grim look, it is because class after class has come to consciousness, and fought its way to participation. As each lower and wider layer of the people learns to cohere effectively about its vital interests, the state becomes more socialized, — a compromise between classes, perhaps, but no longer the monopoly of one class. Slipping from the grasp of the few into the hands of the many, government becomes impartial and tolerant, the warfare of interests becomes in consequence less virulent, and the struggle groups cease to be close of grain and firm of outline.

But it would be rash to conclude that the societary struggle is presently to die out. In an advanced economy divisive interests will continue to marshal men into different camps. Under the popular state the embattled groups, conscious of a fair field, may renounce envenomed weapons and foul play, the collision may leave behind it no inveterate hatreds; but men will not cease to struggle groupwise until they cease to have closer relations or greater community of interests with *some* of their fellow-citizens than with *all*.

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